Brown and the Colorblind Constitution by Schmidt, Christopher W.
Chicago-Kent College of Law
Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law
All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship
12-4-2008
Brown and the Colorblind Constitution
Christopher W. Schmidt
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, cschmidt@kentlaw.iit.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Legal History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has
been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For
more information, please contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 203 (2008).
Available at: http://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol/750
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1311407
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\94-1\CRN104.txt unknown Seq: 1 29-OCT-08 11:14
ESSAY
BROWN AND THE COLORBLIND CONSTITUTION
Christopher W. Schmidt†
This Essay offers the first in-depth examination of the role of colorblind
constitutionalism in the history of Brown v. Board of Education. In light
of the recent Supreme Court ruling in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, such an examination is needed
today more than ever.  In this case, Chief Justice John Roberts drew on the
history of Brown to support his conclusion that racial classifications in
school assignment policies are unconstitutional.  Particularly controversial
was the Chief Justice’s use of the words of the NAACP lawyers who argued
Brown as evidence for his colorblind reading of the landmark school desegre-
gation decision.  I argue that while the historical record shows widespread
faith in the claims of colorblind constitutionalism at the time of Brown,
including among the lawyers for the NAACP and their allies, these claims
were just one of many ways in which civil rights advocates challenged the
constitutionality of school segregation.  And, more importantly, any effort to
claim Brown as a foundation stone for colorblind constitutionalism must
confront the fact that the Supreme Court clearly rejected a sweeping anticlas-
sification justification for its decision in Brown.
“[W]hen it comes to using race to assign children to schools,
history will be heard.”
— Chief Justice John Roberts (2007).1
“[T]he past cannot be allowed to decide for us what it did not have
to decide for itself.”
— Edmond Cahn (1955).2
INTRODUCTION
Brown v. Board of Education3 has always featured prominently in
debates over “colorblind” constitutionalism—the belief that racial
classifications by the government are prohibited by the Equal Protec-
† Visiting Scholar, American Bar Foundation; Visiting Associate Professor, Chicago-
Kent College of Law. B.A. 1996, Dartmouth College; M.A. 2000, Ph.D. 2004, J.D. 2007,
Harvard University.  I am grateful to Richard Fallon, Michael Klarman, Reva Siegel, and
Kristin Stilt for their comments on drafts of this Essay.
1 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2767
(2007).
2 Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 153 (1955).
3 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Yet the June 2007 Su-
preme Court decision striking down race-based school assignment
programs in Louisville and Seattle charted a new course in the Court’s
use of Brown.  In his Opinion of the Court in Parents Involved in Com-
munity Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, Chief Justice Roberts unsur-
prisingly embraced the seminal 1954 school desegregation decision as
supporting his conclusion that it is unconstitutional for school dis-
tricts to take race into account when assigning students to schools.  To
make this point, he looked beyond the traditional grounds of judicial
analysis, namely the text of Brown and subsequent desegregation deci-
sions, and ventured into previously unexplored territory for a Su-
preme Court opinion: the history of the litigation that culminated in
Brown.  Specifically, he turned to the words of National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) lawyers who, during
the Brown litigation, expressed a commitment to the ideal, famously
expressed in Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Fergu-
son, that “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind.”4  In concluding his opin-
ion, Chief Justice Roberts offered a string of quotations from the
briefs and oral arguments of the NAACP lawyers in Brown, indicating
that these words—more than the bare language of the decision it-
self—point to the true meaning of the school desegregation
decisions.5
Surviving members of the NAACP’s legal team responded with
outrage, accusing the Chief Justice of misrepresenting their position
to further an agenda with which they deeply disagree.  The Chief Jus-
tice’s reading of Brown was “preposterous”;6 it stood the NAACP’s “ar-
gument on its head”;7 it was “dirty pool.”8  The dissenting Justices
4 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767–68.  Similarly, Justice Thomas, in addition to
analogizing the position of the dissenters in Parents Involved to that of the lawyers who
opposed the NAACP in Brown, also drew on the words of NAACP lawyers to support his
reading of Brown. Id. at 2782–83 (Thomas, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court’s treatment of Brown dominated media reaction to the Parents
Involved decision. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Op-Ed., History, Principle and Affirmative Action, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 2007, at A11; Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5-4, Limit Use of Race for School
Integration Plans, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A1; Adam Liptak, The Same Words, but Differ-
ing Views, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A24; Juan Williams, Op-Ed., Don’t Mourn Brown v.
Board of Education, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A29; Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court’s
Split Over Public School Integration: Who Really Betrayed Brown’s Legacy? FINDLAW, July 2, 2007,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20070702.html.
6 Liptak, supra note 5 (quoting Jack Greenberg).
7 Id. (quoting Judge Robert L. Carter).
8 Id. (quoting William T. Coleman, Jr.); see also Jack Greenberg, Roberts, Breyer, Louis-
ville, Seattle and Humpty Dumpty, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 10, 2007, http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/jack-greenberg/roberts-breyer-louisvil_b_60000.html (“I was among
those who argued alongside Marshall in Brown.  Nobody at that time had heard of affirma-
tive action. . . .  It never occurred to me or anyone else that we were arguing for a color
blind constitution that would prohibit government from affirmatively preferring African-
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were just as dismayed.  Justice John Paul Stevens labeled the Chief Jus-
tice’s use of Brown to justify striking down school integration plans “a
cruel irony”9 and accused the Chief Justice of “rewrit[ing] the history
of one of this Court’s most important decisions.”10  The majority was
neither “loyal” nor “faithful” to Brown, wrote Justice Stevens.11  From
the bench, Justice Stephen Breyer gave an uncharacteristically emo-
tional reading of his dissent,12 in which he accused the majority of
forgetting “[t]he lesson of history,” and abandoning “the hope and
promise of Brown.”13  The Chief Justice’s critics rejected not only his
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also his attempt to
claim the history of Brown.
In this Essay, I take seriously Chief Justice Roberts’s assumption
that the history of Brown offers valuable insight into the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Material that previously had been of in-
terest predominantly to historians has now assumed new significance
for constitutional interpretation.  By drawing on the language of the
NAACP lawyers in Parents Involved, the Chief Justice seemed to open
the door to an interpretative approach with potentially dramatic im-
plications, even if he was far from self-conscious about what he was
doing.  Indeed, there may be considerable value in recognizing that
constitutional meaning derives not only from the traditional sources
of legal interpretation—constitutional text, original understanding,
and precedent—but also from the historical experience of contesta-
tion over the best reading of the Constitution.14  The Chief Justice was
making a claim that, in essence, elements of the history of the civil
rights struggle should be integrated in constitutional analysis.  This
analytical move raises an array of serious questions for legal interpre-
tation, not the least of which are determinacy problems when the
available array of interpretative sources are potentially so dramatically
expanded and concerns persist regarding the institutional compe-
tence of the judiciary to evaluate these sources.  (As legal historians
have pointed out over and over, Supreme Court Justices have an igno-
Americans by promoting integration.  All others among surviving counsel for the Brown
plaintiffs emphatically disagree with the Roberts characterization and I am confident that
those no longer with us would disagree too.”).
9 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10 Id. at 2798.
11 Id. at 2800.
12 Greenhouse, supra note 5. R
13 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
14 For recent efforts to theorize and defend this point, see Robert Post & Reva Siegel,
Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007);
Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
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minious record when it comes to doing historical interpretation.15)
Such concerns are not the focus of this Essay, however.  Rather, I will
use Chief Justice Roberts’s turn to the history behind Brown as an invi-
tation to explore what this history can actually tell us about the role of
colorblind constitutionalism in Brown.  Once one seriously looks to
the history of colorblind constitutionalism in the struggle that led to
Brown, however, the shortcomings of the Chief Justice’s account be-
come readily apparent.  Most significantly, the Chief Justice offers no
rationale for why he chooses to limit his analysis to a selection of
words by the NAACP lawyers who argued Brown.  To offer a more com-
plete account of the history that Chief Justice Roberts has identified as
relevant, in this Essay I go beyond his selective approach by drawing
on a broader array of sources that shed light on what the key actors in
Brown understood themselves as doing.
Colorblind principles have little basis in the original meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment.16  As Parents Involved makes clear, Brown
has largely replaced the Fourteenth Amendment itself as the pre-
ferred historical foundation for proponents of colorblind constitu-
tionalism.  Even committed originalists, such as Justices Thomas and
Scalia, give scant attention to the framing of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in justifying their faith in colorblind constitutionalism.17  Con-
sidering the obvious weight that the Court is willing to place on the
15 Classic works in this genre include CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE USES OF HISTORY (1969); Gerhard Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused
Muse, 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 89; Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965
SUP. CT. REV. 119; Paul L. Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American Consti-
tutional History, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 64 (1963); William M. Wiecek, Clio as Hostage: The United
States Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 227 (1988).
16 See, e.g., Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 213, 235 n.95 (1991); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985).
17 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS
ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 137–38 (2005) (noting “the stunning silence of Justices Scalia
and Thomas” on the history of the Fourteenth Amendment in explaining their anticlassifi-
cation stances).  Justice Thomas typically defends his reading of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as establishing an anticlassification requirement by reference to general principles of
equality, rather than text or original meaning. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Constitution
abhors classifications based on race, not only because those classifications can harm fa-
vored races or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the govern-
ment places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens
or benefits, it demeans us all.”); id. at 378 (warning that benign racial classifications “only
weaken the principle of equality embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the
Equal Protection Clause”); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (referring to “the princi-
ple of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution” as prohibiting racial
classifications and citing the Declaration of Independence as support for this point); see
also Clarence Thomas, Toward a “Plain Reading” of the Constitution—The Declaration of Inde-
pendence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HOW. L.J. 983, 995 (1987) (“The first principles
of equality and liberty should inspire our political and constitutional thinking.”).
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history of Brown, such an examination of the historical material is es-
sential to an informed debate on the merits of colorblind constitution-
alism in education and elsewhere in American society.
The historical record demonstrates that the Chief Justice was
more right than his critics allow in his characterization of the NAACP:
the civil rights lawyers and their allies indeed expressed, repeatedly, in
public and private statements, a deep commitment to the principle
that use of racial classifications by the government violated the Equal
Protection Clause.  Principles of colorblind constitutionalism inspired
the efforts of many of the NAACP’s allies in the struggle against
school segregation and, more generally, had a powerful presence in
early post–World War II American society.  Colorblind constitutional-
ism was an integral element of the legal and moral challenge to white
supremacy at the time of Brown.
Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberts overstated his claim on
Brown’s history in at least two ways.  First, colorblind constitutionalism
was only one of a number of arguments offered by the NAACP.  Dur-
ing the Brown litigation, lawyers advocating a blanket prohibition of
racial classifications never put forth these arguments in isolation from
other, more context-based, color-conscious arguments relating to the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  At a time when the problem
of “benign” racial preferences and affirmative action was rarely even
considered, civil rights advocates easily moved back and forth between
making anticlassification arguments and claims based on what has
come to be know as “antisubordination” principles—a distinctly color-
conscious interpretation of the equal protection requirement that, in
Reva Siegel’s concise definition, is based on “the conviction that it is
wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior
social status of historically oppressed groups.”18  Furthermore, when
the NAACP lawyers transitioned from defining the equal protection
right to defining the scope of the remedy, they recognized the limita-
tions of anticlassification arguments and looked increasingly to an-
tisubordination arguments to guide the Court’s implementation of
school desegregation.  To now isolate the lawyers’ anticlassification ar-
gument as their only, or even primary, constitutional claim in the
school segregation cases fails to do justice to the historical record.
Yet even if we accept the Chief Justice’s implication that the
NAACP was committed to an anticlassification argument, a second
and more significant weakness of Chief Justice Roberts’s reading of
18 Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Consti-
tutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1472–73 (2004).  For the seminal
articulation of an “antisubordination” reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Owen
M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976), although Fiss
labeled it the “group-disadvantaging principle,” id. at 108.
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Brown is his attempt to extrapolate the views of the Supreme Court
Justices as expressed in their school desegregation decisions from the
arguments of the advocates in Brown.  The history on this point is
quite clear: Although the members of the Brown Court considered
basing their desegregation decisions on the anticlassification princi-
ple, this approach never came close to reflecting the positions of all
nine Justices who committed themselves to the unanimous decisions;
it would not have even secured a majority of the Justices at the time of
Brown.  The Brown decision actually reflected a conscious effort by the
Justices to not accept the general principle of colorblind
constitutionalism.
Considering the importance the history of Brown has assumed in
the contemporary debate over colorblind constitutionalism, there
have been remarkably few efforts to explore the role of the colorblind
principles in the history of Brown.  This historical investigation is par-
ticularly necessary because the dissenting opinions in Parents Involved
did not engage with the majority opinions on the question of the his-
tory behind Brown.  The primary dissent, written by Justice Breyer, fo-
cuses on the experience with school desegregation following the
Brown decisions—not the preceding litigation history.19  Among legal
scholars, the issue has not been directly examined.  The best study of
Brown and the anticlassification principle is Reva Siegel’s 2004 article
Equality Talk, which examines not the history of the decision itself, but
the formation of a colorblind reading of Brown in the face of attacks
on the decision’s legitimacy in the late 1950s and the 1960s.20  The
history of the background of the ruling is outside the scope of her
article.  Similarly, David A. Strauss’s often-cited article Discriminatory
Intent and the Taming of Brown21 examines why, in the 1970s and
1980s,  the Court chose some interpretations of Brown over others and
the consequences of those choices.  Ian F. Haney Lo´pez’s recent study
of what he terms “reactionary colorblindness” gives only cursory atten-
tion to the use of colorblind arguments in Brown.22  The only scholar
to directly address the role of colorblind arguments in Brown itself is
Andrew Kull, who included a brief chapter on Brown in The Color-Blind
Constitution.23  Yet Kull’s criticism of Brown for failing to embrace the
19 See infra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. R
20 Siegel, supra note 18. R
21 David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
935 (1989).
22 See Ian F. Haney Lo´pez, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Color-
blindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1000–01 (2007) (limiting discussion to a short section enti-
tled “The Liberal Argument for Colorblindness in Brown”).
23 ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 151–63 (1992).
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colorblind principle24 leads him to inadequately recognize the diver-
sity of the arguments against segregation in the Brown litigation.
This lack of attention to the history of Brown, including the litiga-
tion history, the decision-making process of the Justices,25 and the im-
mediate reception of the decision, is a major gap in the scholarship
on Brown and colorblind constitutionalism.  Considering the weight
the Parents Involved majority accorded this history, the shortcomings in
the historical record have implications not only for scholarly under-
standing of Brown, but also for present-day equal protection doctrine.
The role of colorblind ideals in the history of Brown has yet to be
examined in all its fullness and complexity.  This Essay is an effort to
fill this void.
I
PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS AND BROWN
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
1, the Supreme Court struck down the race-based school assignment
policies of the Seattle and Louisville school districts as violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.26  The dis-
tricts adopted their programs in efforts to ensure that their schools
would retain a certain level of racial diversity.27  Although Justice Ken-
nedy’s concurring opinion seems to leave the door open for the lim-
ited use of racial preferences in public school assignments,28 the Chief
Justice’s Opinion of the Court and Justice Thomas’s concurrence are
premised on a sweeping condemnation of racial classifications.  While
the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas enlisted Brown to support their
anticlassification positions, the dissenters offered a sharply contrasting
interpretation of Brown, rejecting the majority’s anticlassification argu-
ments in favor of a vision of Brown centered on the importance of
integrated education.  Under this view, Brown should be read to en-
courage—or, at minimum, not to stand in the way of—policies that
combat segregated schools.
24 See, e.g., id. at 152 (describing the Brown opinion as “historically and legally je-
june”); id. at 161 (describing the Supreme Court’s confusing and contradictory segrega-
tion jurisprudence through the 1950s, including Brown, as “an intellectual void”).
25 A prominent exception in this area is the work of Michael Klarman. See, e.g, Klar-
man, supra note 16, at 226–57 (examining the Supreme Court’s consideration of the racial R
classification rule in the post-1937 era).
26 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2746
(2007).
27 See id.
28 See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2006 Term Comment, Justice Kennedy
and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104 (2007); James E. Ryan, The Su-
preme Court 2006 Term Comment, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV.
L. REV. 131, 135–36 (2007).
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Chief Justice Roberts relied on the history of Brown as the center-
piece of the concluding section—and rhetorical climax—of his opin-
ion.  The bulk of the opinion consists of a description of the social
costs of allowing localities to practice racial “balancing” in making
their school assignments.  To permit racial balancing would “‘effec-
tively assur[e] that race will always be relevant in American life, and
that the ultimate goal of eliminating entirely from governmental deci-
sion making such irrelevant factors as a human being’s race will never
be achieved.’”29  More generally, racial classifications “promote ‘no-
tions of racial inferiority and  lead to a politics of racial hostility.’”30
Further, “ ‘race is treated as a forbidden classification [because] it de-
means the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry
instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.’”31  Roberts
then turned to Brown, with the pronouncement: “[W]hen it comes to
using race to assign children to schools, history will be heard.”32  To
demonstrate that his reading of Brown as support for the anticlassifica-
tion principle is in accordance with “the heritage of Brown,”33 he of-
fered the words of the NAACP lawyers who argued the case, believing
that their position on this question “could not have been clearer.”34
He quoted from a brief submitted by the NAACP lawyers: “ ‘[T]he
Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from according differential
treatment to American children on the basis of their color or race.’”35
And he quoted NAACP lawyer Robert Carter, who made much the
same point in oral argument: “ ‘We have one fundamental contention
which we will seek to develop in the course of this argument, and that
contention is that no State has any authority under the equal-protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in
affording educational opportunities among its citizens.’”36  “There is
no ambiguity in that statement,” the Chief Justice explained.  “And it
was that position that prevailed in this Court, which emphasized in its
remedial opinion that what was ‘[a]t stake is the personal interest of
the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a
29 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2758 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.)).
30 Id. at 2767 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493).
31 Id. (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000)).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 2768 (quoting Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2, and 3 and for Respondents in
No. 5 on Reargument at 15, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 1,
2, 3, 5)).
36 Id. at 2767–68 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Brown I, 347 U.S. 483
(No. 1)).
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nondiscriminatory basis,’ and what was required was ‘determining ad-
mission to the public schools on a nonracial basis.’”37
Roberts concluded his opinion:
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and
could not go to school based on the color of their skin.  The school
districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of demon-
strating that we should allow this once again—even for very differ-
ent reasons.  For schools that never segregated on the basis of race,
such as Seattle, or that have removed the vestiges of past segrega-
tion, such as Jefferson County, the way “to achieve a system of deter-
mining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis,” is to
stop assigning students on a racial basis.  The way to stop discrimina-
tion on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race.38
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas used Brown for two
purposes.  First, he drew on Brown to identify a historical pedigree for
the “colorblind Constitution.”  “I am quite comfortable in the com-
pany I keep,”39 Justice Thomas noted in defending the colorblind
Constitution.  He quoted from Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy, which
he embraced as “[m]y view” as well as “the rallying cry for the lawyers
who litigated Brown.”40  In support of this point, he gave three quota-
tions from NAACP-authored briefs in Brown and two quotations from
oral arguments41 and a reference to Thurgood Marshall’s admiration
of Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent.42
37 Id. at 2768 (emphasis of Chief Justice Roberts (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ.
(Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1955)).
38 Id. at 2768 (quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300–01) (citation omitted).
39 Id. at 2782 (Thomas, J., concurring).
40 Id.
41 Id. (quoting parenthetically Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and Respon-
dents in No. 5 on Reargument at 65, Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5) (“That the
Constitution is color blind is our dedicated belief.”)); id. (quoting parenthetically Brief for
Appellants in No. 1 at 5, Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (“The Fourteenth Amendment precludes a
state from imposing distinctions or classifications based upon race and color alone.”)); id.
at 2782 n.20 (quoting parenthetically Statement as to Jurisdiction at 8, Davis v. County Sch.
Bd., 347 U.S. 483 (No. 3) (companion case to Brown I) (“[W]e take the unqualified posi-
tion that the Fourteenth Amendment has totally stripped the state of power to make race
and color the basis for governmental action.”)); id. (quoting parenthetically Transcript of
Oral Argument at 7, Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (No. 1) (“We have one fundamental contention
which we will seek to develop in the course of this argument, and that contention is that no
State has any authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens.”)); id.
(quoting parenthetically Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Briggs v. Elliott, 347 U.S. 483
(No. 2) (companion case to Brown I) (“[T]he state is deprived of any power to make any
racial classifications in any governmental field.”)).
42 Id. at 2782–83 (quoting parenthetically IN MEMORIAM, HONORABLE THURGOOD MAR-
SHALL: PROCEEDINGS OF THE BAR AND OFFICERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, at x (Nov. 15, 1993) (remarks of Judge Motley) (“Marshall had a ‘Bible’ to which
he turned during his most depressed moments.  The ‘Bible’ would be known in the legal
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Second, Justice Thomas drew on Brown to attack the dissenting
Justices, comparing his colleagues to those who defended segregation
in the 1950s. In “giv[ing] school boards a free hand to make deci-
sions on the basis of race,” the Parents Involved dissenters embraced
“an approach reminiscent of that advocated by the segregationists in
Brown v. Board of Education.”43  Justice Thomas offered a step-by-step
summary of the dissent’s position, juxtaposing each argument with
the words of the “segregationists” in Brown.44  In response to the dis-
senters’ claim that they could distinguish invidious racial classifica-
tions, such as the school segregation laws at issue in Brown, from
benign racial classifications designed to encourage diversity, Justice
Thomas noted that “[t]he segregationists in Brown argued that their
racial classifications were benign, not invidious.”45  “What was wrong
in 1954 cannot be right today,”46 he concluded.
Whatever else the Court’s rejection of the segregationists’ argu-
ments in Brown might have established, it certainly made clear that
state and local governments cannot take from the Constitution a
right to make decisions on the basis of race by adverse possession.
The fact that state and local governments had been discriminating
on the basis of race for a long time was irrelevant to the Brown
Court.  The fact that racial discrimination was preferable to the rele-
vant communities was irrelevant to the Brown Court.  And the fact
that the state and local governments had relied on statements in
this Court’s opinions was irrelevant to the Brown Court.  The same
principles guide today’s decision.47
The dissenting opinions of Justices Stevens and Breyer do not fo-
cus on the history behind Brown as much as the history that Brown set
in motion.48  Justice Breyer’s primary concern was with the “promise
community as the first Mr. Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson . . . .  I do not know
of any opinion which buoyed Marshall more in his pre-Brown days . . .”)).  In a footnote
later in his concurrence, Justice Thomas juxtaposed a quotation from an NAACP brief in
Brown with a quotation from Justice Breyer’s dissent to make this same point. Id. at 2786
n.28.
43 Id. at 2768; see also id. at 2783 (comparing the dissenters to “segregationists in Brown
[who] embraced the arguments the Court endorsed in Plessy”).
44 Id. at 2783–86.
45 Id. at 2786 n.27.
46 Id. at 2786.
47 Id.
48 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence touched on Brown only lightly and showed none of
the interest in its background history that is evidenced in the opinions of the Chief Justice
and Justice Thomas.  Nonetheless, Brown plays an important symbolic role in Justice Ken-
nedy’s concurrence.  He turned to Brown as a moderating influence—as a testament to the
necessary mixture of pragmatism and principle that is necessary to further the compelling
state interest in creating a diverse educational environment while avoiding race-based solu-
tions that risk “entrench[ing] the very prejudices we seek to overcome.” Id. at 2788 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).  Although he is committed to “[t]he enduring hope is that race
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\94-1\CRN104.txt unknown Seq: 11 29-OCT-08 11:14
2008] BROWN AND THE COLORBLIND CONSTITUTION 213
of Brown,”49 a promise best understood through the line of Supreme
Court precedents extending from Brown, rather than the details of
litigation leading up to Brown.  The majority’s use of the history of
Brown, Justice Breyer argued, is deeply misleading.
The lesson of history is not that efforts to continue racial segrega-
tion are constitutionally indistinguishable from efforts to achieve ra-
cial integration.  Indeed, it is a cruel distortion of history to
compare Topeka, Kansas, in the 1950’s to Louisville and Seattle in
the modern day—to equate the plight of Linda Brown (who was
ordered to attend a Jim Crow school) to the circumstances of
Joshua McDonald (whose request to transfer to a school closer to
home was initially declined).  This is not to deny that there is a cost
in applying “a state-mandated racial label.”  But that cost does not
approach, in degree or in kind, the terrible harms of slavery, the
resulting caste system, and 80 years of legal racial segregation.50
Since Brown, “attitudes toward race in this Nation have changed dra-
matically,” Breyer noted.51
Many parents, white and black alike, want their children to attend
schools with children of different races.  Indeed, the very school dis-
tricts that once spurned integration now strive for it.  The long his-
tory of their efforts reveals the complexities and difficulties they
have faced.  And in light of those challenges, they have asked us not
to take from their hands the instruments they have used to rid their
schools of racial segregation, instruments that they believe are
needed to overcome the problems of cities divided by race and
poverty.52
This is a “modest request” that the Court should not deny, he
concluded.53
should not matter,” for Kennedy, a sweeping dismissal of racial classifications is “not suffi-
cient to decide these cases.” Id. at 2791.
Fifty years of experience since Brown v. Board of Education should teach us
that the problem before us defies so easy a solution.  School districts can
seek to reach Brown’s objective of equal educational opportunity. . . .  To
the extent the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that
state and local school authorities must accept the status quo of racial isola-
tion in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.
Id. (citation omitted).  If, for Justice Kennedy, the evocation of the ideal of the colorblind
Constitution provides the aspirational principle, then Brown and the experience of school
desegregation it launched demonstrate the real compromises necessary to move the nation
toward this ideal.  For an insightful analysis of Kennedy’s concurrence, see Gerken, supra
note 28. R
49 Id. at 2837 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 2836 (quoting id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (citations omitted).
51 Id. at 2836–37.
52 Id. at 2837.
53 Id.
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In his own dissent, Justice Stevens praised Justice Breyer’s dissent
as “eloquent and unanswerable”54 and then went on to attack the
Chief Justice’s opinion for abandoning Brown and other school deseg-
regation precedents.  “There is a cruel irony in the Chief Justice’s reli-
ance on our decision in Brown,” Stevens wrote, since the
desegregation decision was concerned less with classifications than the
subjugation of a class of people.55  Application of strict scrutiny to be-
nign racial preference policies such as the school assignment pro-
grams under review, Justice Stevens noted, “obscures Brown’s clear
message.”56  Put simply, “the Chief Justice rewrites the history of one
of the Court’s most important decisions.”57  Earlier Courts were “more
faithful to Brown.”58  At one point in his opinion, Justice Stevens wryly
quoted from the Chief Justice’s recent dissent in a case where Roberts
referred to the “familiar adage that history is written by the victors.”59
II
BROWN AND THE COLORBLIND CONSTITUTION: THE HISTORY
What is one to make of this battle over the history of Brown?  It is
a rather strange turn in the legal debate over school integration policy
when the Court treats one of its own opinions almost as if it were
constitutional text, with the spare language of the opinion taken as an
invitation to delve into the history behind these words and a survey of
precedent turned into an exploration of the circumstances and inten-
tions of the decision’s formation.  Of course Brown has never been
treated like an ordinary Supreme Court opinion.  From the day it was
announced, supporters and critics understood the rather mild, even
bland, eleven-page opinion to be a transcendent statement of policy
and principle.  After the early 1970s, when it was no longer acceptable
for mainstream politicians to publicly oppose the decision,60 conserva-
tives and liberals continued to struggle over Brown’s meaning.  The
Parents Involved decision is the latest manifestation of this ongoing
debate.
54 Id. at 2797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 2798.  To support this conclusion, Justice Stevens offered, in a footnote, a
quotation from Charles Black’s classic 1960 defense of Brown, which emphasized the histor-
ical fact that segregation “was imposed on one race by the other race; consent was not
invited or required.” Id. at 2798 n.2 (quoting Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the
Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 425 (1960)).
56 Id. at 2799.
57 Id. at 2798.
58 Id. at 2800.
59 Id. at 2798 (quoting Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 127 S. Ct. 1706, 1720
(2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).
60 See Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education, 52
RUTGERS L. REV. 383, 446 (2000).
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The most notable element that the opinions of the Chief Justice
and of Justice Thomas add to this debate is their interest in not just
the legacy of Brown (the focus of the dissenting opinions by Justices
Breyer and Stevens), but the history of the litigation that led to Brown.
In attempting to discern the meaning of Brown, they argue that the
arguments presented to the Court offer additional guidance, with the
words of the victorious NAACP lawyers accorded particular—perhaps
even conclusive—interpretive authority.  This new development in the
struggle over the meaning of Brown demands a reconsideration of the
history on which the Justices are relying.  Although a debate over the
history of Brown is far from the best way to engage with the difficult
questions of racial classifications, education, and the Fourteenth
Amendment,61 as long as the Court finds this material useful, a more
thorough historical analysis of the role of the principle of a “color-
blind Constitution” in Brown is warranted.
The problems with trying to determine a definitive “meaning” of
Brown with regard to the anticlassification principle are numerous.
First, there is the question of which historical sources to evaluate.  Ob-
viously the first stop must be the text of the Brown opinion, along with
the text of Bolling v. Sharpe,62 the companion decision to Brown that
evaluated the constitutionality of segregated schools in Washington,
D.C., and the Brown implementation ruling of 1955.63  But what then?
Brown, perhaps more than any other Supreme Court decision, has al-
ways been seen as particularly the product of legal advocacy.  As Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas recognized in Parents Involved, the
courageous work of the NAACP legal team deserves a primary voice in
defining Brown.  Justice Thomas went further, suggesting that the le-
gal claims of the lawyers who opposed the NAACP and argued on be-
half of state segregation laws also deserve attention—as examples of
arguments that were rightfully discarded in Brown.  But to rely, as
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas did, solely on these histori-
cal grounds to determine the essence of Brown is a severely limited
61 For a forcefully argued alternative approach to this issue, see Comfort v. Lynn Sch.
Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 27 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring) (“The Lynn plan at issue
in this case is fundamentally different from almost anything that the Supreme Court has
previously addressed.  It is not, like old-fashioned racial discrimination laws, aimed at op-
pressing blacks, nor, like modern affirmative action, does it seek to give one racial group
an edge over another (either to remedy past discrimination or for other purposes).  [T]he
plan does not segregate persons by race.  Nor does it involve racial quotas.”) (citations
omitted); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162,
1193 (9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“[T]here is something unreal about their
efforts to apply the teachings of prior Supreme Court cases, all decided in very different
contexts, to the plan at issue here.  I hear the thud of square pegs being pounded into
round holes.”).
62 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
63 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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approach to a complex historical question.  If their goal was to deter-
mine the meaning of Brown on the question of anticlassification, the
approach they chose was overly selective.  Other historical materials
would seem just as relevant, if not more so, to any serious effort to
reconstruct the meaning of Brown.
For example, in Parents Involved, the Justices did not consider his-
torical materials describing the internal decision-making process of
the Brown Court, but surely this material is essential to an attempt to
determine a definitive meaning of the decision.  Also, there were
briefs submitted to the Court beyond those of the NAACP and the
lawyers for the states that were just as influential (and perhaps more
influential) for the Justices of the Brown Court.  Finally, the immediate
reception of Brown provides valuable information about what this de-
cision meant to those not directly involved in its creation, but whose
views would be integral to the fate of the landmark decision.  In
Brown, as in Parents Involved, the Supreme Court Justices and litigants
recognized that in the end, their legal arguments and opinions would
only be effective if understood and accepted by the nation.  This Part
examines the historical evidence in each of these areas.
A. Textual Evidence—The Desegregation Opinions
What do the texts of the seminal school desegregation deci-
sions—Brown I, Bolling v. Sharpe, and Brown II—say about racial classifi-
cations?  Simply stated, not that much.
In the first Brown decision, Chief Justice Earl Warren went out of
his way to emphasize the limited scope of the holding.  The legal rea-
soning hewed closely to the context of segregation in the area of edu-
cation, and the decision avoided directly overruling Plessy.  The
central question before the Court was not drawn from any general
principle, either based on racial classifications or the “separate-but-
equal” doctrine of Plessy.  Rather, as Warren explained, the question
presented was: “Does segregation of children in public schools solely
on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other ‘tan-
gible’ factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority
group of equal educational opportunities?”64  To support the Court’s
conclusion that public school segregation categorically failed to
achieve equal educational opportunities, Chief Justice Warren turned
to the harm to black children caused by segregation: the “feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”65  At no point
in the decision did Chief Justice Warren come close to explicitly re-
64 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
65 Id. at 494.
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jecting Plessy beyond its applications to schools; nor did he even hint
at a blanket condemnation of racial classifications.
Brown’s companion decision, Bolling v. Sharpe, which ruled on a
challenge to segregated schools in Washington, D.C., more directly
refers to an anticlassification principle.  Because this case reviewed
congressional legislative action, the relevant constitutional provision
was the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  The Court pushed
aside the potential difficulties of fitting an equal protection analysis
into the Due Process Clause, noting that “discrimination may be so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.”66  The Court concluded
that “[c]lassifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with
particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence
constitutionally suspect.”67
In terms of textual support for a colorblind interpretation of the
school segregation cases, the implementation decision of 1955 pro-
vides perhaps the most promising language of these three decisions.
Although in Brown II Chief Justice Warren defined the holding in
Brown I narrowly, never suggesting that it applied beyond the schools
(it “declar[ed] the fundamental principle that racial discrimination in
public education is unconstitutional”68), he suggested that, within the
educational context, anticlassification principles have some
resonance.  In Brown II, Warren stated that Brown I was intended to
create “a system of public education freed of racial discrimination”69
and to protect the “personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to
public schools . . . on a nondiscriminatory basis.”70  The ultimate goal
was “to achieve a system of determining admission to the public
schools on a nonracial basis.”71
Despite the careful delimitation of Brown to schools, in the follow-
ing years the Supreme Court reviewed a series of challenges to segre-
gation statutes that applied to various public facilities and
transportation services and, in each case, cited Brown as the basis for
striking down these laws.72  These cases, announced in brief per
curiam decisions that did little more than cite Brown, led many com-
mentators to believe that the Court had effectively abandoned the lim-
66 Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499–500.
67 Id. at 499.
68 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 298.
69 Id. at 299.
70 Id. at 300.
71 Id. at 300–01.
72 See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958)
(per curiam) (parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (buses); Holmes
v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (golf courses); Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (beaches).
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ited language of Brown for a more sweeping condemnation of
segregation per se—even if the Court itself, to the frustration of some
legal academics,73 never bothered to explain that this was what it was
doing.  It would not be until 1964, in McLaughlin v. Florida,74 that the
Court clearly stated that racial classifications were presumptively inva-
lid under the Fourteenth Amendment and struck down a law based
on this principle.75  The McLaughlin Court cited Brown as demonstrat-
ing that racial classifications have been held invalid in the context of
segregated schools.76
The paucity of direct engagement with racial classifications in the
Brown decisions themselves—despite the fact that an anticlassification
position was supported by some of the Justices77 and was squarely
presented in the briefs and oral arguments78—makes Chief Justice
Roberts’s assertion in Parents Involved that an anticlassification princi-
ple “prevailed” in Brown79 difficult to sustain based on the bare text of
these opinions.  While Bolling and Brown II hinted at the principle, the
Court’s unwillingness to explicitly articulate an interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause at the time indicates that no such principle
prevailed in the landmark segregation cases of 1954–55.
73 Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme
Court, 1948–1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 60–61 (1979) (describing critical reaction of legal schol-
ars to the per curiam decisions).
74 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
75 Id. at 191–92 (“[W]e deal here with a classification based upon the race of the
participants, which must be viewed in light of the historical fact that the central purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official
sources in the States.”); see also id. at 198 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I cannot conceive of a
valid legislative purpose under our Constitution for a state law which makes the color of a
person’s skin the test of whether his conduct is a criminal offense. . . .  I think it is simply
not possible for a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality
of an act depend upon the race of the actor.  Discrimination of that kind is invidious per
se.”); Klarman, supra note 16, at 255 (“For the first time the Court in McLaughlin both R
articulated and applied a more rigorous review standard to racial classifications, requiring
as justification an ‘overriding’ state purpose as well as a showing that the classification was
‘necessary,’ rather than just rationally related, to the proffered governmental interest.”
(footnote omitted)). But see KULL, supra note 23, at 163 (suggesting that the start of “a R
brief period during which our Constitution was effectively color-blind” can be marked by
the Supreme Court’s affirmance of a federal district court opinion in which Judge John
Major Wisdom argued that Brown had held racial classifications to be “‘inherently discrimi-
natory and violative of the Equal Protection Clause’”) (quoting Dorsey v. State Athletic
Comm’n, 168 F. Supp. 149, 151 (E.D. La. 1958), aff’d mem., 359 U.S. 533 (1959)).
76 McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192.
77 See infra Part II.B.
78 See infra Part II.C–D.
79 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768
(2007).
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B. The Justices
Although, in the years preceding Brown, several Supreme Court
Justices had offered, in their opinions, variations on the colorblind
principle,80 during the deliberations in Brown, only two Justices voiced
a belief that racial classifications were per se unconstitutional.  Most of
the Justices thought a sweeping anticlassification interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause was unnecessary to decide the school segrega-
tion issue and undesirable due to the implications such an interpreta-
tion might have for the volatile question of interracial marriage.
Of the Justices who decided Brown, Justice William O. Douglas
was the most dedicated proponent of the anticlassification principle.
“[S]egregation is an easy problem,” he explained to the other Justices
in their private conference following the first round of arguments in
Brown.  “[N]o classifications [sic] on the bassis [sic] of race can be
made[.]  [The] 14th amendment prohibits racial classifications, so
does [the] due process clause of the 5th.”81  He reiterated this posi-
tion at the conference following the second round of oral arguments
in 1953: “Race and color cannot be a constitutional standard for seg-
regating the schools.”82  This language was consistent with opinions
Justice Douglas wrote throughout his judicial career.83
The only Justice who echoed Justice Douglas’s anticlassification
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment during the delibera-
tions in Brown was Justice Sherman Minton.  “[C]lassification on the
80 See, e.g., South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 278 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discrim-
ination based on race is “beyond the pale”); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect.  That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.  It is
to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ances-
try are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon
the doctrine of equality.  For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based
on race alone has often been held to be a denial of equal protection.”); Edwards v. Califor-
nia, 314 U.S. 160, 180, 185 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring) (referring to race as “constitu-
tionally an irrelevance”).
81 Transcription of William O. Douglas, Conference Notes—First Brown Conference
(Dec. 13, 1952), William O. Douglas Papers, Box 1150, Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division, Washington, D.C. (alteration in original) (on file with author) [hereinafter Doug-
las Conference Notes—First Brown Conference].
82 Transcription of William O. Douglas, Conference Notes—Second Brown Confer-
ence (Dec. 12, 1953), William O. Douglas Papers, Box 1149, Library of Congress, Manu-
script Division, Washington, D.C. (on file with author) [hereinafter Douglas Conference
Notes—Second Brown Conference].
83 Douglas was the first Justice to cite Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent and its reference
to the colorblind Constitution.  Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 185 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).  Justice Douglas was also the only Justice on the Brown Court still sitting in
1974 when the first challenge to affirmative action in an educational context arrived,
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), and he used this opportunity to denounce all
racial classifications as violative of the principle of Brown. Id. at 342–44 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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basis of race does not add up,” Justice Minton explained in confer-
ence.  “[I]t’s invidious and can’t be maintained.”84  He repeated this
basic point at the second conference, a year later, when he stated,
“[you] can’t classify on the basis of color.”85
Justice Hugo Black also seemed intent on committing the Court
to a generally applicable and readily defined interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but he never fully embraced the anticlassifi-
cation argument as did Justices Douglas and Minton.  At times, he ex-
pressed sympathy for some elements of colorblindness, but he also
argued that the primary target of the Fourteenth Amendment was
“caste”—not simply classifications or discrimination.  As he told the
conference: “the [Reconstruction] Amendments have as their basic
purpose protection of the negro against discrimination”86 and “the
abolition of  such castes.”87  And the purpose of segregation laws was
“to discriminate because of color.”88  Although Justice Black offered
no indication of how his “anti-caste” reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment would extend to situations beyond school segregation,
he had no trouble concluding that this interpretation sufficiently justi-
fied the Court’s holding in Brown.89
Justices Douglas and Minton (and, to a lesser extent, Justice
Black), were, however, the exceptions on the Court at the time of
Brown.  The other Justices were hesitant to embrace any kind of sweep-
ing pronouncement on the scope of the Equal Protection Clause.  For
example, Justice Robert H. Jackson, who warily recognized that the
anticlassification principle lurked behind the entire legal challenge to
84 Douglas Conference Notes—First Brown Conference, supra note 81. R
85 Douglas Conference Notes—Second Brown Conference, supra note 82.  Douglas R
recognized Minton as an ally in these cases.  Years later, Douglas wrote: “[W]hen it came to
the Equal Protection Clause, no one was more adamant than Minton in insisting on equal-
ity in the treatment of blacks.  He was indeed one of the great mainstays in the early
school-desegregation cases.” WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939–1975: THE AU-
TOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 246 (1980).  Yet, unlike Douglas, Minton would not
take his anticlassification rhetoric to its logical conclusion.  When, in the years immediately
following Brown, the Court received challenges to state anti-miscegenation laws, Minton
voted to deny certiorari. See Hutchinson, supra note 73, at 62 n.525, 64. R
86 Douglas Conference Notes—First Brown Conference, supra note 81. R
87 Transcription of Tom Clark, Conference Notes—First Brown Conference (n.d.),
Tom Clark Papers, Box 27A, Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas (on file with author).
88 Douglas Conference Notes—First Brown Conference, supra note 81. R
89 In the years following Brown, Justice Black became more explicitly committed to
anticlassification principles, and his retrospective justification for Brown changed accord-
ingly. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 342 n.42 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) (“We
agree, of course, that the Fourteenth Amendment is ‘color blind,’ in the sense that it out-
laws all state laws which discriminate merely on account of color.  This was the basis upon
which the Court struck down state laws requiring school segregation in Brown v. Board of
Education.”).
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segregation,90 believed the best approach was to recognize that the
Court was dealing with an essentially political issue, which could re-
quire consideration of the pragmatic challenges of nationwide deseg-
regation.91  Justice Felix Frankfurter too was intensely concerned with
protecting the Court’s integrity and, in Brown, took upon himself the
role of the cautious institutional guardian.  The reason the Court was
able to eventually arrive at its desegregation decision, he believed, was
because of the “clear thinking, skillful maneuvering, and disinterested
persistence” of Justice Jackson and himself.  “I shudder to think the
disaster we would have suffered—the country, that is—if the ‘libertari-
ans,’ the heir of Jefferson [Black] and the heir of Brandeis [Douglas]
had had their way!”92  To Justice Frankfurter, it was a matter of prag-
matic statesmanship.  Justice Frankfurter, like Justice Jackson, was
clearly concerned with the controversial implications of adopting “the
all-embracing principle, that no legislation which is based on differen-
tiation of race is valid.”93
Similarly, newly appointed Chief Justice Earl Warren approached
the issue from a basically political, contextual position and showed
little interest during the deliberations in basing the Brown ruling on a
broad, abstract, legal principle.  His unwavering support for school
desegregation derived from his belief that segregation was an obvious
form of racial oppression, his commitment to the importance of edu-
cation for the welfare of the nation, and his instinctive empathy for
children.94  Chief Justice Warren was also strongly influenced by Jus-
tice Frankfurter during his early years on the Court.95  From start to
finish, Chief Justice Warren approached the Brown decision primarily
90 Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Charles Fairman (Apr. 5, 1950), Robert
Houghwout Jackson Papers, Container 12, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Wash-
ington, D.C. (“It seems to present a pretty naked question whether there is any constitu-
tional right to make any classification based on race.”); Memorandum by Robert H.
Jackson (Mar. 15, 1954), Robert Houghwout Jackson Papers, Box 184, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. .
91 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 304–07 (2004).
92 Philip Elman, The Solicitor General’s Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litiga-
tion, 1946–1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 839 (1987) (quoting Letter from
Justice Frankfurter to Philip Elman (July 21, 1954)).
93 ARGUMENT: THE ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, 1952–55, at 117 (Leon Friedman ed., 1969) [hereinafter
ARGUMENT].
94 See, e.g., Interview by Richard Kluger with Earl E. Pollock, former clerk to Chief
Justice Earl Warren (Aug. 19, 1974), Brown v. Board of Education Collection, Series 1, Box
5, Warren File, Manuscripts and Archives, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New
Haven, Conn. (Statement of Pollock, who helped draft Brown, that “If there were three
things of great value and stimulation to [Chief Justice Warren], they were (1) equality, (2)
education, and (3) young people”).
95 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—A
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 146 (1983); G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 178
(1982).
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as an act of political statesmanship,96 and references to sweeping pro-
positions of colorblind constitutionalism did not serve this goal.
Of the remaining Justices—Stanley Reed, Harold Burton, Tom
Clark—none expressed interest in committing the Court in Brown to
an anticlassification interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Justice Reed, who had personal reservations toward racial integration,
was the last Justice to sign on to Warren’s opinion.  He appeared to
believe that the course of history might very well lead to some sort of
colorblind constitutionalism,97 but he came to this conclusion reluc-
tantly, and he certainly was not willing to agree to such an approach at
the time of Brown.98  Justice Burton had none of Justice Reed’s reluc-
tance on civil rights questions, but he had a conciliatory temperament
and moderate approach to the law that pulled him away from the
more sweeping principles that attracted Justices Black and Douglas.99
The ruling “should be done in [as] easy [a] way as possible,” he told
the other Justices during their first Brown conference.100  Similarly,
Justice Clark was much more concerned with the problems of imple-
mentation than a general constitutional principle on which the deseg-
regation ruling would be based.101  Throughout the Court’s
engagement with the school desegregation issue, Justice Clark had no
problem drawing distinctions—between, for example, graduate edu-
cation and lower levels of schooling—that had little basis in constitu-
tional principle but were aimed at easing the nation’s transition to an
integrated society.102
A particularly powerful factor steering the Justices away from em-
bracing a sweeping anticlassification argument was their interest in
keeping the Court away from the hot-button issue of interracial mar-
riage.  At the time of Brown, when national opinion was moderately in
96 See, e.g., Memorandum from Earl Warren to the Members of the Court (May 7,
1954), Earl Warren Papers, Container 571, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C. (describing his goal that the Brown opinion was to be “non-rhetorical,
unemotional and, above all, non-accusatory”).
97 In a personal memorandum written in 1949, Reed conceded: “It may be that segre-
gation is not a lasting condition.  It may be an exception of the moment in the movement
toward abolition of all distinctions of people by law.” JOHN D. FASSETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE:
THE LIFE OF STANLEY REED OF KENTUCKY 561 (1994).
98 See id. at 555–80; RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF Brown v. Board
of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality 595–96, 680, 691–93, 698 (1976).
99 See generally MARY FRANCES BERRY, STABILITY, SECURITY, AND CONTINUITY: MR. JUSTICE
BURTON AND DECISION-MAKING IN THE SUPREME COURT, 1945–1958 (1978).
100 Transcription of Robert H. Jackson, Conference Notes—First Brown Conference,
(Dec. 12, 1952), Robert Houghwout Jackson Papers, Box 184, Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress, Washington, D.C. (on file with author).
101 Douglas Conference Notes—First Brown Conference, supra note 81. R
102 See, e.g., Memorandum on Sweatt and McLaurin from Mr. Justice Clark to the Con-
ference (Apr. 7, 1950), reprinted in Hutchinson, supra note 73, at 89–90. R
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favor of the Court’s school desegregation ruling,103 overwhelming ma-
jorities of white Americans, in both the North and South, opposed
interracial marriage.104  Segregationists regularly sought to rally oppo-
sition to school desegregation by characterizing it as the first step to-
ward “open[ing] the bedroom doors of our white women to the
Negro men.”105  The volatility of this issue was not lost on the Justices,
particularly Justice Frankfurter.  In the first round of oral arguments
in Brown, in 1952, Justice Frankfurter stated the issue bluntly in an
exchange with the lawyer for the students in the District of Columbia
case.  “[I]s it your position,” he asked, “that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment or the Fifth, for your purposes, automatically invalidates all legis-
lation which draws a line determined because of race? . . .  I wonder
whether you would say, right off from your analysis of the Constitu-
tion, that marriage laws relating to race are ipso facto on the face of
things, unconstitutional?”106  Justice Frankfurter was clearly skeptical
of an “all-embracing principle” prohibiting racial classifications, and
he seemed relieved when the lawyer qualified his position by invoking
the “immediately suspect” criteria from Korematsu.107  “That simply
means that [a racial classification] can be valid,” Justice Frankfurter
explained.  “It is not an absolute prohibition . . . .”108
In the aftermath of Brown, Justice Frankfurter took it upon him-
self to protect the Court from having to face the interracial marriage
issue.  In the fall of 1954, the Court denied certiorari in a challenge to
Alabama’s miscegenation statute.109  The issue resurfaced in 1955 in
Naim v. Naim, a challenge to Virginia’s miscegenation law.110  Justice
Burton’s clerk bluntly assessed the situation: “In view of the difficulties
engendered by the segregation cases it would be wise judicial policy to
duck this question for a time.”111  Justice Frankfurter, who told his
fellow Justices that considering the “momentum of history, deep feel-
ing, moral and psychological presuppositions” surrounding miscege-
103 GEORGE H. GALLUP, 2 THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION, 1935–1971, at 1249–51
(1972) (reporting July 1954 polls that found 54% approved of Brown, and 41%
disapproved).
104 Id. at 1572.
105 Alabama: Marengo Meeting, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville), Jan. 6, 1955, at 2, quoted in
Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 446
(2005).
106 ARGUMENT, supra note 93, at 116. R
107 Id. at 117.
108 Id.
109 Jackson v. Alabama, 72 So. 2d 114 (Ala. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954).
110 Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam),
on remand 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam).
111 Hutchinson, supra note 73, at 63 (quoting Certiorari Memorandum on Naim v. R
Naim from AJM [Clerk] to Justice Burton, at 3 (Oct. Term 1955)).
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nation, the Court would be better off avoiding the issue,112
spearheaded a series of evasive maneuvers to avoid deciding the case,
a dance they repeated the following year.113  In 1957, Justice Frank-
furter wrote to Judge Learned Hand that a miscegenation challenge
was “vividly in the offing.  We twice shunted it away and I pray we may
be able to do it again, without being too brazenly evasive.”114  In an
effort to convince Judge Hand of the correctness of this judicial pol-
icy, he confided to his friend that the Court never intended Brown to
require a blanket prohibition on racial classifications.  The holding
“did not rest on the absolute that the XIVth in effect said ‘[every]
state law differentiating between colored and non-colored is forbid-
den.’”115  Such a sweeping holding “would not have commanded una-
nimity” in Brown.116  “I know I would not have agreed to it—nor, I’m
sure would several others.”117
Not until 1964 would the Supreme Court explicitly accept an an-
ticlassification interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.118  It
would take another three years for the Court to squarely face the issue
it had so diligently avoided following Brown and hold anti-miscegena-
tion laws unconstitutional.119  “At the very least,” Chief Justice Warren
wrote in Loving v. Virginia, “the Equal Protection Clause demands that
racial classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be sub-
jected to the ‘most rigid scrutiny,’ and, if they are ever to be upheld,
they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some
permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination
which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to elimi-
nate.”120  This step, however, was taken by a very different Court than
the one that had decided the Brown cases; and it was offered to a na-
tion that had experienced, between 1954 and 1967, a convulsive cul-
tural transformation on questions of race.
112 Memorandum of Mr. Justice Frankfurter on Naim v. Naim (Read at Conference,
Nov. 4, 1955), reproduced in Hutchinson, supra note 73, at 95. R
113 See generally Hutchinson, supra note 73, at 62–67 (discussing the Court’s avoidance R
of Naim); Klarman, supra note 105, at 446–50 (discussing strategies the Court employed to R
avoid miscegenation cases). Cf. also KULL, supra note 23, at 158 (“What seems clear in R
retrospect . . . is that no amount of argument could have induced the Court to decide the
School Segregation Cases on the basis that the Constitution was color-blind, or on any
other basis that implied a resolution of issues of racial discrimination not yet before it.”).
114 GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 667 (1994) (quoting
Letter from Justice Frankfurter to Judge Learned Hand (Sept. 17, 1957)).
115 Id. at 669 (quoting Letter from Justice Frankfurter to Judge Learned Hand (Sept.
27, 1957)).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
119 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
120 Id. at 11 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)) (citation
omitted).
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In sum, although two of the Justices accepted, at least rhetori-
cally, the premise of colorblind constitutionalism at the time of Brown,
the rest of the Court seemed to view Harlan’s Plessy dissent and its
eloquent mantra, “our Constitution is color-blind,” to be a powerful
principle, perhaps a useful rallying point in moving the nation toward
a greater commitment to racial equality, but too bold to be embraced
as a matter of constitutional doctrine.  To use the anticlassification
argument as the basis for desegregating the schools would call into
question all racial classifications.  For the majority of the Justices on
the Court in 1954–55, this went too far, particularly considering the
paranoia that surrounded segregationist fears of miscegenation.
C. The NAACP
The basic format of the NAACP’s legal argument against segre-
gated education remained remarkably consistent throughout the se-
ries of litigation that eventually culminated in Brown.  The lawyers’
first line of attack was an assertion of the anticlassification principle, a
claim that was put forth with increasing emphasis and directness as
the lawyers’ confidence in the Court’s sympathy for their attack on
segregation grew.  Yet this argument was never put forth in isolation
from a more contextual and color-conscious analysis of the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the harms of segregation.  An-
ticlassification language was always intertwined with analysis of the so-
cial consequences of racial segregation and the value of
integration.121  While often framed as a fallback position from the
bolder, more sweeping anticlassification claims, these arguments, all
variations on the modern antisubordination interpretation of Equal
Protection, actually occupied the lawyers to a far greater degree, in
terms of space given in the briefs and time given in oral arguments.
For example, in their brief in Sweatt v. Painter,122 a challenge to the
exclusion of blacks from the University of Texas Law School, NAACP
lawyers drew extensively on anticlassification arguments,123 yet they as-
121 This blending of anticlassification and antisubordination claims can be seen in the
NAACP’s first major school integration case of the postwar period. See Brief for Petitioner
at 27, Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (No. 369) (“Classi-
fications and distinctions based on race or color have no moral or legal validity in our
society.”); id. at 36 (“Segregation in public education helps to preserve and enforce a caste
system which is based upon race and color.  It is designed and intended to perpetuate the
slave tradition sought to be destroyed by the Civil War and to prevent Negroes from attain-
ing the equality guaranteed by the federal Constitution.”).
122 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
123 Brief for Petitioner at 6, Sweatt, 339 U.S. 629 (No. 44) (“[The Equal Protection
Clause] has been interpreted as embodying a fundamental hostility to racial distinctions
and classifications, and as incorporating into the fundamental law the democratic credo
that governmental action based upon race and blood are necessarily arbitrary.”); see also id.
at 9 (“[U]nder the equal protection clause a governmental classification based upon race
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serted that if the Court refused to accept these arguments, they would
attack the separate-but-equal doctrine.124  However, the two strands of
argumentation were never fully distinguished.  “[A]ll agree that one
of [the] primary purposes [of the Fourteenth Amendment] was to
raise the Negro to a status of equality and full citizenship,” their brief
explained in a summary of an antisubordination interpretation of
equal protection, but the very same sentence concluded with an asser-
tion of anticlassification principles, citing “a national interest in the
maintenance of individual freedom from discrimination based upon
race or color.”125  This language encapsulates the civil rights lawyers’
unproblematic linkage between a distinctly color-conscious reading of
the Fourteenth Amendment with an assertion of the anticlassification
principle.126  Quite simply, they understood the two as mutually
reinforcing.
The same arguments—referencing themes of both anticlassifica-
tion and antisubordination—appeared in briefs to the Supreme Court
that the NAACP filed in the public school segregation cases.  As the
lawyers gained confidence in the prospects for a favorable ruling over
the several rounds of arguments, they pressed their anticlassification
arguments more assertively, yet they never abandoned color-conscious
rationales for desegregation.  Indeed, these antisubordination claims
still occupied a majority of the space in their briefs.  The NAACP’s
anticlassification argument in the public schools cases was initially ten-
tative and secondary, in terms of the length and depth of analysis (if
not ordering), to the primary argument—the argument to which the
trial courts had been more receptive—that segregated education
caused emotional and psychological damage in children.127  Over the
following years, the NAACP became more confident pushing its an-
ticlassification argument.  In a brief filed in 1952, the NAACP pro-
claimed at the start of its argument summary: “The Fourteenth
or color is unconstitutional per se.”); id. at 32–34 (arguing for strict scrutiny of racial
classifications).
124 Id. at 7.
125 Id. at 41; see also id. at 75 (“The basic law of our land, as crystallized in our Constitu-
tion, rejects any distinctions made by government on the basis of race, creed, or color.
This concept of true equality has become synonymous with what is generally defined as
‘the American Creed.’”)
126 See, e.g., Thurgood Marshall, The Supreme Court as Protector of Civil Rights: Equal Protec-
tion of the Laws, 275 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 101–02 (1951) (describing the
equal protection principle as “the right to be free from differences of treatment because of
race, color, blood, or national origin,” yet noting that “[t]he obligation to furnish equal
protection of the laws does not establish an abstract uniformity applicable alike to all per-
sons without regard to circumstances or conditions”).
127 See Statement as to Jurisdiction at 12, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (No. 1) (arguing that there was no “legitimate legislative objective” that could be
served by drawing racial distinctions).
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Amendment precludes a state from imposing distinctions or classifica-
tions based upon race and color alone.”128
In oral argument, the NAACP continued to highlight its anticlas-
sification claims, though when pressed by the Justices, the lawyers
were prepared to defend their more race-based, contextual, and his-
torical claims.  “We have one fundamental contention which we will
seek to develop in the course of this argument,” Robert Carter told
the Court, “and that contention is that no state has any authority
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its
citizens.”129  When Justice Frankfurter worried that embracing an an-
ticlassification interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause would re-
quire deciding the case “by some abstract declaration,” a prospect he
clearly found problematic,130 Carter explained that the anticlassifica-
tion argument was just “one of the bases for our attack,”131 and then,
taking Justice Frankfurter’s not-so-subtle hint, moved to the “second
part of the main contention,”132 that segregated schools could never
be truly equal because of the stigma that attached to the black schools.
But when Justice Black pushed Carter on this damage argument, par-
ticularly the psychological evidence on which it was based,133 Carter
retreated back to the anticlassification argument: “Now, of course,
under our theory, you do not have to reach the finding of fact or a
fact at all in reaching the decision because of the fact that we maintain
that this is an unconstitutional classification being based upon race
and, therefore, it is arbitrary.”134
128 Brief for Appellants at 6–7, Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 1); see also id. at 6–7
(“When the distinctions imposed are based upon race and color alone, the state’s action is
patently the epitome of that arbitrariness and capriciousness constitutionally impermissive
under our system of government.”).
129 ARGUMENT, supra note 93, at 14; see also id. (“It is our position that any legislative or R
government classification must fall with an even hand on all persons similarly situated.”);
id. at 15 (“[U]nder the decisions of this Court that no state can use race, and race alone, as
a basis upon which to ground any legislative, any lawful constitutional authority . . . this
Court has indicated that race is arbitrary and an irrational standard . . . .”); id. at 25 (“I
would think . . . that without regard to the question of its effect on Negroes, that this
business of classification, this Court has dealt with it time and time again.”).
130 Id. at 26; see also id. at 117 (recording Justice Frankfurter discussing “the all-embrac-
ing principle, that no legislation which is based on differentiation of race is valid”).
131 Id. at 26.
132 Id. at 15, 26; see also id. at 35 (“This case could also be decided on the question of
equal educational opportunities as they are examined by the approach of McLaurin and
Sweatt.”).
133 Id. at 34–35.
134 Id. at 35; see also id. (“Now, to conclude, our feeling is that this case could be de-
cided on the question of the illegality of the classification itself.”); id. at 171 (recording
NAACP lawyer Jack Greenberg retreating from damage argument to anticlassification argu-
ment upon being challenged by Justice Black).
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Thurgood Marshall also easily moved back and forth between an-
ticlassification claims—which he noted had the benefit of offering a
“very clear and logical approach”135—and more color-conscious, con-
text-based arguments.  He stated in oral argument that “so far as the
decisions of this Court, this Court has repeatedly said that you cannot
use race as a basis of classification,”136 but then directly followed this
with reference to the argument based on the psychological damage
segregated schools inflicted on black schoolchildren.137  “The primary
objective of this recent litigation,” Marshall told a conference of civil
rights lawyers and educators in 1952, “has been to obtain full and
complete integration of all students on all levels of public education
without regard to race or color.”138  This quotation perfectly captures
the basic assumption of Marshall and others who articulated the color-
blind ideal in this period: that it would result in substantive racial
integration.
The other lawyers who argued on behalf of the black schoolchil-
dren in the four cases that were consolidated in the Brown decision
generally followed the same pattern, blending the two lines of argu-
ment.  The lawyers representing the students in the Washington, D.C.
case, Bolling v. Sharpe, who were not part of the NAACP legal team,
relied more heavily on the anticlassification principle than did the
NAACP lawyers in the states cases.  (“They would have none of our
modulated, less than all-or-nothing approaches,” recalled Jack Green-
berg.139)  Yet even here, their attack on racial classifications always em-
phasized the lived experience of African American subordination
under Jim Crow.  George E.C. Hayes pressed the Justices to recognize
this caste system as an evil to be combated though the ideal of a color-
blind Constitution.  When asked what possible reason Congress might
have for classifying students according to race, Hayes argued that “it
was done purely and for no other reason than because of the fact that
it pretended to keep for him this place of secondary citizenship.”140
He demanded that opposing lawyers explain the policy of segregated
schools as based on anything other than “pure racism.”141  When
135 Id. at 199.
136 Id. at 65.
137 Id.
138 Thurgood Marshall, An Evaluation of Recent Efforts to Achieve Racial Integration in Edu-
cation Through Resort to the Courts, 21 J. NEGRO EDUC. 316, 327 (1952).
139 JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS
FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 172 (1994); see also id. at 86 (“[James Nabrit]
would have nothing to do with anything that faintly suggested that if schools were equal-
ized segregation might be acceptable.”); Discussion of Papers, 21 J. NEGRO EDUC. 327, 338
(1952) (recording challenge by Professor James M. Nabrit of Marshall to accept anticlassifi-
cation claim as the central issue).
140 ARGUMENT, supra note 93, at 114. R
141 Id.
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pressed on whether his embrace of anticlassification would invalidate
interracial marriage prohibitions, Hayes backtracked slightly, noting
that heightened scrutiny may allow classifications in limited circum-
stances—a concession that Hayes intended to apply only to situations
such as a threat to national security but which Justice Frankfurter
thankfully accepted as a reference to politically threatening situations
such as interracial marriage.142
The central challenge in determining what the lawyers for the
NAACP thought with regard to the conflict between anticlassification
and antisubordination principles is that, at the time of Brown, they saw
no need to choose between the two approaches.  They clearly made
strong anticlassification arguments.  They did so repeatedly and elo-
quently.  But these arguments never stood apart from other argu-
ments that did not rely upon colorblind principles.  In making the
case for Brown, the NAACP lawyers moved back and forth between
anticlassification and antisubordination claims.  They saw no contra-
diction in linking arguments that drew on the ideal of a colorblind
Constitution with arguments that engaged the history of white
supremacy and the intention of the Fourteenth Amendment to pro-
tect and elevate the newly freed slaves.
D. The Justice Department
A series of amicus briefs submitted by the Justice Department in
support of desegregation were particularly influential with the Court
in the school desegregation cases.143  Thus, they too deserve consider-
ation in an effort to illuminate the role of colorblind constitutional-
ism in the making of Brown.  The Justice Department, like the NAACP,
presented a strong case for a colorblind interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment.  At times, the government lawyers appeared even
more committed to anticlassification principles than the civil rights
lawyers.  Yet the Justice Department too never made these arguments
in isolation from antisubordination claims.  The government briefs,
like those of the NAACP, put forward the principle of colorblind con-
stitutionalism in the context of an analysis that highlighted the spe-
142 Id. at 116–17; see also id. at 118, 119, 121 (argument of James Nabrit).
143 Chief Justice Warren had just arrived on the Court in the fall of 1953, having spent
the past decade as California attorney general and then governor, and he especially appre-
ciated the guidance offered by the Justice Department.  In an early draft of Brown he sin-
gled out a government brief as “particularly objective and helpful.”  Earl Warren,
Memorandum 2–3 (n.d.), Earl Warren Papers, Container 571, Manuscript Division, Li-
brary of Congress, Washington, D.C.  This specific reference to the Justice Department’s
brief was left out of the final draft of Brown. See Christopher William Schmidt, Postwar
Liberalism and the Origins of Brown v. Board of Education 523–24 (2004) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author), available at ProQuest, Doc. ID
813765271.
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cific harms of racial segregation and the necessity of integrated
education.
Involvement of the executive branch in the issue of school segre-
gation began with a 1947 report issued by the President’s Committee
on Civil Rights, instituted by President Harry S. Truman.144  The re-
port, titled To Secure These Rights, presented a sweeping condemnation
of nationwide practices of racial discrimination.  While the document
lacked the kind of rousing colorblind rhetoric that would become
commonplace in the government’s amicus briefs, its authors accepted
the general axioms of colorblind ideology: racial distinctions were
generally analogous to religious and ethnic differences,145 individual-
ism was a paramount value of Americanism,146 and race should be an
“irrelevant factor[ ]” in society.147  This formalistic, idealistic language
was balanced with a thorough dissection of the systemic oppression of
African Americans in American society.  Segregation was wrong not
because of the mere fact of government racial classifications; rather,
because it “marks groups with the brand of inferior status,” it fails to
result in equal facilities, and also because of the “incontrovertible evi-
dence that an environment favorable to civil rights is fostered when-
ever groups are permitted to live and work together.”148 To Secure
These Rights laid out a basic framework for the liberal civil rights pro-
gram of the day, combining principles of anticlassification with a cri-
tique of racial hierarchies and a commitment to the values of
integration.
Government briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in subse-
quent civil rights cases echoed this blending of anticlassification and
antisubordination principles.149  In Brown, the brief submitted by the
Justice Department placed the executive branch squarely behind the
anticlassification principle:
144 TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF HARRY S TRUMAN’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RIGHTS (Steven F. Lawson ed., Bedford/St. Martin’s 2004) (1947).
145 Id. at 55–58.
146 Id. at 50 (“The central theme in our American heritage is the importance of the
individual person.”).
147 Id. at 50.
148 Id. at 179.
149 Brief for the United States at 14–16, Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816
(1950) (No. 25) (referencing anticlassification arguments); id. at 19–23 (attacking segrega-
tion in railroad accommodations as violative of associational rights of whites); Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 52, Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (Nos. 72, 87,
290, 291) (“The decisions of this Court stand in vigorous affirmation of the principle that
‘our Constitution is color blind.’  The Court has been consistent and unequivocal in its
denunciation of discriminations based on color.”); id. at 54 (“Distinctions based on race or
color alone are in most instances irrelevant and, therefore, invidious under the Constitu-
tion.”); id. at 55 (noting that the “primary object” of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
protect “the rights and liberties of the Negro”).
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[R]acial discriminations imposed by law, or having the sanction or
support of government, inevitably tend to undermine the founda-
tions of a society dedicated to freedom, justice, and equality.  The
proposition that all men are created equal is not mere rhetoric.  It
implies a rule of law—an indispensable condition to a civilized soci-
ety—under which all men stand equal and alike in the rights and
opportunities secured to them by their government.  Under the
Constitution every agency of government, national and local, legis-
lative, executive, and judicial, must treat each of our people as an
American, and not as a member of a particular group classified on
the basis of race or some other constitutional irrelevancy.  The color
of a man’s skin—like his religious beliefs, or his political attach-
ments, or the country from which he or his ancestors came to the
United States—does not diminish or alter his legal status or consti-
tutional rights.  “Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows
nor tolerates classes among citizens.”150
“Regrettably,” the brief noted, when Justice Harlan offered his famous
dictum, “he was speaking only for himself, in dissent.”151  Like the
NAACP lawyers, the government lawyers never rested their case solely
on the anticlassification principle.  Concluding their brief, they of-
fered another quotation from Harlan’s dissent, this one emphasizing
its anti-caste elements: “We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our peo-
ple above all other peoples.  But it is difficult to reconcile that boast
with a state of the law which, practically, puts the brand of servitude
and degradation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, our equals
before the law.”152
Despite the respect Chief Justice Warren and his colleagues ac-
corded the position of the Executive Branch on this momentous issue,
the Justices’ pragmatic and institutional concerns prevented them
from echoing in the Brown decisions the sweeping anticlassification
language that the Justice Department offered.  Nonetheless, this rhet-
oric both indicates the prevalence of colorblind constitutional princi-
ples during the Brown era and emphasizes the fact that these
principles were never put forth without support from anti-caste
arguments.
E. Brown’s Reception and Colorblind Constitutionalism in
Postwar America
The intertwining of anticlassification and antisubordination
claims with neither understood as necessitating exclusion of the
150 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3–4, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown
I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (footnote omitted).
151 Id. at 4 n.2.
152 Id. at 32 (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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other—as done by the lawyers advocating for school desegregation
and by the Brown Court Justices—was also a prominent theme outside
the Court.  At the time of Brown, supporters of the decision recog-
nized it as both a proclamation of the principle of colorblind constitu-
tionalism and as a statement on the oppressive consequences of
segregation and the necessity for racially integrated education in mod-
ern American society.  Neither interpretation dominated the dis-
course surrounding the landmark ruling, and commentators,
following the lead of the civil rights lawyers, often intertwined anticlas-
sification and antisubordination interpretations of Brown.
Many observers approvingly concluded that, in Brown, the Court
had finally embraced the colorblind reasoning of Justice Harlan’s
Plessy dissent.  In an editorial titled Justice Harlan Concurring, the New
York Times explained that, with Brown, “the words [Harlan] used in his
lonely dissent . . . have become in effect . . . a part of the law of the
land.”153  Although the decision was carefully limited to schools,
“there was not one word in Chief Justice Warren’s opinion that was
inconsistent with the earlier views of Justice Harlan.”154  David Fell-
man proclaimed in the American Political Science Review, “For now in-
deed has Justice Harlan’s celebrated declaration in his dissenting
opinion in the Plessy case, that ‘our Constitution is color-blind,’ been
adopted as law.”155  Edmund Cahn saw the decision as vindicating
“Harlan’s prophetic phrases.”156
Yet, as supporters of Brown also noted, Harlan’s “prophetic
phrases,” referenced not only the ideal of a colorblind Constitution,
but also the need to dismantle the racial caste system in America.157
The Chicago Defender declared that the decision meant “the beginning
of the end of the dual society in American life.”158  “It recognizes the
growing national feeling that the separation of Negro (or other mi-
153 Justice Harlan Concurring, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1954, at E10.
154 Id.
155 David Fellman, Constitutional Law in 1953–1954, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63, 96 (1955)
(quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
156 Cahn, supra note 2, at 169; see also ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CLARENCE CLYDE FERGU- R
SON, JR., DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW: THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE SCHOOL SEGREGA-
TION CASES 157 (1957) (stating that Brown marked the acceptance by the Court of Harlan’s
dissent in Plessy); JOHN P. ROCHE, THE QUEST FOR THE DREAM: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL
RIGHTS AND HUMAN RELATIONS IN MODERN AMERICA 245 (1963) (stating that with Brown,
the “United States Constitution had become ‘color blind’”); Loren P. Beth, Justice Harlan
and the Uses of Dissent, 49 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1085, 1092 (1955) (describing Harlan’s Plessy
dissent as “directly and highly influential, one may assume, in the School Segregation Cases”);
Louis H. Pollak, The Supreme Court Under Fire, 6 J. PUB. L. 428, 438 (1957) (“In short, the
opinion in the School Segregation Cases might have been helped by a crisper statement
that . . . ‘Our Constitution is color-blind . . . .’” (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting))).
157 “Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
158 Prelude to Freedom, CHI. DEFENDER, May 29, 1954, at 11.
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nority) children from the majority race at school age is an abuse of
the democratic process and the democratic principle,” wrote the Bos-
ton Herald.159  In perhaps the most famous scholarly defense of Brown,
Yale Law Professor Charles Black saw the decision resting on the “mas-
sive historical evidence” showing that segregation “has the designed
and generally apprehended effect of putting its victims at a
disadvantage.”160
Commentators also recognized the Court’s achievement as simul-
taneously striking at racial classifications and systemic racial inequal-
ity.  “The Supreme Court not only upheld Justice John M. Harlan’s
famous dictum that ‘the Constitution is colorblind’ today,” New York
Times reporter James Reston explained, “but also based its decision on
the primacy of the general welfare.”161  Even those who thought the
ideal of colorblind constitutionalism was the motivating principle be-
hind the decision had to recognize that Chief Justice Warren’s opin-
ion relied extensively on the harms of segregation on African
Americans.162  At a time when “benign” racial preferences for minori-
ties were nothing more than hypothetical constitutional theorizing,
no one saw that abandoning racial classifications while also attacking
entrenched segregation and inequality might be a contradictory pro-
ject.  Recognition that these arguments might, in fact, be in tension
with one another would only arise out of the struggle over
implementation.
F. The Implementation of Brown and the Transformation of
Colorblind Constitutionalism
The struggle to desegregate schools in the decades following
Brown transformed the ideological valence of colorblind constitution-
alism.  The anticlassification claim was the boldest argument in the
debate over the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment that led to
Brown.  If the Court were to accept this rationale, not only would it
void all school segregation laws, it would also void all the race-based
laws on which Jim Crow had been built, thus delving into areas (such
as interracial marriage regulations) that the Court was hoping to
avoid for as long as possible.  The more context-specific claims—rang-
ing from the argument that segregation had failed to create equal fa-
cilities to the even narrower argument focusing on the psychological
damage that resulted from separate schools—would allow for a more
limited ruling.
159 Equality Redefined, BOSTON HERALD, May 18, 1954, reprinted in BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION: A Brief History with Documents 205, 205 (Waldo E. Martin Jr. ed., 1998).
160 Black, supra note 55, at 428. R
161 James Reston, A Sociological Decision, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1954, at 14.
162 See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 2. R
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When it came time to debate implementation, however, this situa-
tion was reversed.  In the struggle to make school desegregation a re-
ality, anticlassification arguments were transformed into the more
moderate option.  After the first Brown decision, the NAACP pressed
the colorblind principle as a less revolutionary approach than more
substantive, outcome-based guidelines for school desegregation.
This shift was foreshadowed by Thurgood Marshall’s first oral ar-
gument in the school desegregation cases before the Supreme Court.
In an effort to downplay the consequences of a potential desegrega-
tion decision, Marshall emphasized that the NAACP was “not asking
for affirmative relief,” but merely to have legal restrictions lifted.163
“You mean,” Justice Frankfurter asked, “if we reverse, it will not entitle
every mother to have her child go to a nonsegregated school in Clar-
endon County?”164  Marshall responded, no, this was not what they
were asking for.
If the [school district] lines are drawn on a natural basis, without
regard to race or color, then I think that nobody would have any
complaint. . . .  [T]he only thing that would come down would be
the decision that whatever rule you set in, if you set it, shall not be
on race, either actually or by any other way.165
All the plaintiffs were asking for, he emphasized, “is to take off this
state-imposed segregation.  It is the state-imposed part of it that affects
the individual children.”166  Even in this early discussion of implemen-
tation, the transformation of the anticlassification principle from an
idealistic “reach” argument for civil rights activists to a relatively mod-
erate position that would minimize the effects of desegregation is evi-
dent.  Moreover, as the text of Brown II indicates through its stronger
overtures toward the anticlassification principle than Brown I, the Su-
preme Court was willing to inch further toward the anticlassification
principle in discussing the implementation of school desegregation
than it had been in its initial ruling.  In this context the distinction
between “desegregation” and “integration” arose,167 with those who
hoped to minimize the impact of Brown favoring the former option
and often supporting it with rhetoric about the importance of remov-
163 ARGUMENT, supra note 93, at 47. R
164 Id.
165 Id. at 48.
166 Id. at 49; see also id. at 78 (recording Spotswood W. Robinson, a lawyer for the
students in the Virginia case, arguing that “under the circumstances, what you do is, you
simply make all the facilities in the county available to all the pupils, without restriction or
assignment to particular schools on the basis of race”).
167 Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (“The Constitution . . . does
not require integration.  It merely forbids discrimination.  It does not forbid such segrega-
tion as occurs as the result of voluntary action.  It merely forbids the use of governmental
power to enforce segregation.”).
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ing laws that divide students by race.168  The Virginia Attorney Gen-
eral was moving toward this distinction when, in asking the Court in
Brown II to allow a period of “gradual adjustment,” he described the
goal of Brown as a move from the “existing segregated system to a sys-
tem not based on color distinction” but immediately qualified this
concession by noting “that does not mean enforced integration to us
in Virginia.”169
In the wake of Brown II and subsequent desegregation rulings,
what had once seemed a bold assault on the idea that the Constitution
could be squared with official categorizations of race that resulted in
pervasive, debilitating social inequalities became a moderate ap-
proach and gradually gained the adherence of conservative interests.
It was a “cooler,” more limited way to talk about constitutional equal-
ity;170 it marked a “taming” of the transformative decision.171  The
Court’s eventual embrace of an anticlassification reading of Brown was
a strategic decision made largely in reaction to attacks on the legiti-
macy of the desegregation ruling.  The colorblind Constitution was, as
Reva Siegel put it, the “residuum of conflicts over enforcing Brown.”172
The victors in this conflict over the meaning of Brown, as measured by
the Court’s constitutional doctrine in recent decades, were conserva-
tives who saw colorblind constitutionalism as a more desirable option
than an antisubordination reading of Brown.
A qualification is necessary at this point: While an anticlassifica-
tion interpretation of Brown would be pressed with particular urgency
as it received a newfound conservative political valence in the 1960s
and beyond, this interpretation is more than just a pragmatic defense
against the transformative potential of an antisubordination interpre-
tation.  Anticlassification claims, while never predominant and never
put forth in isolation from more contextual challenges to racial subor-
dination, were a pervasive part of the civil rights debate in the period
preceding and immediately following Brown.  They did not arise only
subsequent to the decision in efforts to defend and legitimate the
Court’s actions.173
168 See Mark V. Tushnet, The Supreme Court’s Two Principles of Equality: From Brown to
2003, in FROM THE GRASSROOTS TO THE SUPREME COURT: Brown v. Board of Education and
American Democracy 340 (Peter F. Lau ed., 2004).
169 ARGUMENT, supra note 93, at 431–32. R
170 Siegel, supra note 18, at 1477. R
171 Strauss, supra note 21. R
172 Siegel, supra note 18, at 1533. R
173 But see id. at 1478 (“In law and in popular debate, Brown is often invoked as an
opinion prohibiting states from classifying on the basis of race.  But in so recalling Brown,
we reason from an understanding that emerged from struggles over enforcement of the
decision, rather than from an understanding that prevailed at the time the case was
decided.”).
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The ideal of a legal system that banishes racial distinctions was
inspiring to many Americans in the early postwar period; it was not
only civil rights lawyers who looked to colorblind ideology as a guiding
principle for racial progress.174  The artificiality of the color line was
far from a new theme in American culture, but mid-century liberals
took particular interest in the issue to further their argument that the
universality of the human race was a central component of the Ameri-
can way of life.  According to one historian, in this period a “species-
centered” discourse dominated progressive discussions of race (as op-
posed to the more recent multicultural model of “ethnos-centered”
discourse).175  Universalist arguments were designed to destroy any re-
spectability that remained for theories of scientific racism and ideas of
inherent biological differences between the races (and the corollary
that certain races were therefore superior to others)—a task made es-
pecially urgent after the horrors of the Holocaust.  This was the gener-
ation that produced popular works with titles such as One World,176
Brothers Under the Skin,177 and The Family of Man.178  “More and more
scientists, realizing the dire importance of the race problem to human
welfare, are going out of their way to state unequivocally the falseness
of the belief that such a difference exists,” Walter White, executive
secretary of the NAACP, approvingly noted in 1948.179  For those who
saw the courts as a promising path for civil rights reform, the anticlas-
sification principle and the idea of a colorblind Constitution were the
legal analogues to this universalist sentiment.
Thus, the post-Brown debates emerged in a cultural context in
which colorblind principles were more than merely pragmatic defense
mechanisms intended to limit the scope of integration remedies. In-
terpretations of Brown as embodying colorblind constitutionalism re-
ceived renewed urgency in the following years as supporters of Brown
drew on the anticlassification principle to defend the legitimacy of the
decision, and this inaugurated a new era of colorblind constitutional-
ism in which it would become the favored interpretation of conserva-
tives.  But this new era had its roots in a deep commitment among
liberal Americans at the time of Brown to the idea of a colorblind soci-
ety.  Anticlassification claims were a powerful, if far from exclusive, or
even prevailing, element of the civil rights debate in the period pre-
ceding and immediately following Brown.
174 See generally Schmidt, supra note 143, at 24–111. R
175 DAVID A. HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIC AMERICA: BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM 51–77
(1995).
176 WENDELL L. WILLKIE, ONE WORLD (1943).
177 CAREY MCWILLIAMS, BROTHERS UNDER THE SKIN (1943).
178 EDWARD STEICHEN, THE FAMILY OF MAN (1955).
179 WALTER WHITE, A MAN CALLED WHITE 364 (1948).
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The post-Brown transformation of colorblind constitutionalism
into a more moderate, and eventually a conservative, reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment was both an extension of ideas that were
prevalent at the time of Brown and a shift in the discourse.  At the time
of Brown, anticlassification principles were widely recognized as ambi-
tious, even quixotic.  In the following decades, with attacks on the Su-
preme Court’s supposed lack of neutrality in Brown and with the rise
of affirmative action, colorblind constitutionalism had become a cen-
terpiece of conservative constitutional interpretation.
CONCLUSION
By pressing beyond the text of Brown and subsequent school de-
segregation decisions and drawing on the history behind Brown to in-
form the Court’s equal protection doctrine, Chief Justice Roberts’s
Parents Involved opinion gives rise to an array of challenging questions,
concerning the difficulties of both historical understanding and con-
stitutional interpretation.  The obvious threshold question is whether
it is possible to divine from the complexities of history a clear “mean-
ing” or “lesson” of Brown.  Both sides of the debate surrounding the
Parents Involved decision seem to think so.  Chief Justice Roberts con-
cluded that the meaning of Brown is unambiguous.  Justice Stevens
argued that the majority misread the history, and the lawyers who took
part in the Brown litigation have accused the Court of misunderstand-
ing their work.  Guiding assumptions here are that Brown meant some-
thing and that the decision’s meaning can be defined with sufficient
clarity to inform today’s debate over the proper reading of the Equal
Protection Clause.  But as the preceding survey of the history of Brown
indicates, the decision meant different things to different people at
different times, and it is far too simplistic to take a snapshot of a single
moment and a single perspective—from the early 1950s or from to-
day—and declare it as the meaning of Brown.
The Court’s use of the history of Brown as a basis for a colorblind
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment should not be easily dis-
missed.  Although the words of the NAACP lawyers might not be as
unambiguous as Chief Justice Roberts assumed, he did identify a cen-
tral component of their argument.  And this argument was far from
unique to the NAACP legal team or aberrational in postwar America.
Debates over civil rights from the mid-1940s through the 1960s were
permeated with articulations of the anticlassification principle and ad-
miring references to Justice Harlan’s admonishment that “[o]ur Con-
stitution is color-blind.”  By the time of Brown, anticlassification
arguments had assumed a front-line position in the NAACP’s legal as-
sault on Jim Crow.  Furthermore, these arguments were embraced by
lawyers in the United States Justice Department and were supported
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by at least two Supreme Court Justices.  Many supporters of Brown saw
the decision as establishing a new norm under which classifications
based on race were presumptively, or perhaps categorically, prohib-
ited.  Colorblind constitutionalism proved particularly attractive to a
generation of liberals who were committed to a universalist ideology
premised on the ideas that racial identity was a legal and moral irrele-
vance and that progressive racial policy should move beyond racial
categorizations.  Anticlassification was not merely a pragmatic defense
of a controversial decision.  It was also an aspiration for a new era of
American life.  The colorblind ideal resonated; it was an important,
although likely not essential, selling point for the new departure of
Brown.  So to now assume that integration was the sole legitimate
meaning of Brown tells only part of the history.
This is far from the end of the story, however.  Before Brown can
be used as a foundation stone for a colorblind Constitution, certain
qualifications are necessary.  NAACP lawyers and their allies who em-
braced anticlassification arguments never made these arguments in
isolation from other arguments that fall into the category of what has
come to be known as antisubordination claims.  Even if the NAACP
and Justice Department briefs in Brown led with calls for a colorblind
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the bulk of these briefs
were dedicated to demonstrating the dangers of a racial caste system
and the harms of segregated schools to children.  These lawyers saw
no need to decide between anticlassification and antisubordination
claims; at the time of Brown, they did not even see them as mutually
exclusive.  To now portray the NAACP as embracing one claim to the
exclusion of the other distorts the historical record.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court soundly rejected an anticlassifi-
cation rationale for Brown.  In arguing that the Brown Court actually
accepted the anticlassification argument of the NAACP, Chief Justice
Roberts is simply wrong.  Because the Brown Court sought to limit its
holding to school desegregation—and especially to avoid the hot-but-
ton topic of miscegenation—it was never a real option for the Court
to embrace an all-encompassing prohibition on racial classifications.
In short, for those who seek to construct an historical foundation for a
colorblind reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, the history of
Brown offers, at best, only qualified support.
